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Abstract: COVID-19 brought tremendous challenges to the world during 2020. The consequences of the pan-
demic are still hard to estimate. However, the socio-economic crisis that hit every nation, from major developed 
economies to least developed countries is transversal and quite visible. Despite the existence of various con-
text-speci$c approaches, there is a global e%ort that stands on three main areas: scienti$c research, ultimately 
focused on $nding a cure or a vaccine; technological use to support social changes on domains like work, dis-
tance-learning or risk detection; and governmental measures promoting lockdown, isolation and safety prac-
tices. This research is focused on the use of technology to improve the response to the pandemic in a globalised 
network society by tracking patterns of interaction between people. The use of self-tracking apps has been 
pushed by various governments, raising concerns regarding surveillance, social control and data collection. We 
analyse through the walkthrough method a group of 13 mHealth apps that were supported by public authorities 
during 2020. Stemming from a critical sociological perspective of contemporary uses and consumptions of digi-
tal media, we gather data that promotes a deeper understanding of the role that this kind of apps has in normal-
ising surveillance practices for political purposes and their potential impact in everyday life.
Keywords: Covid-19; mHealth apps; government surveillance; self-tracking; a%ordances.
Resumo: A COVID-19 trouxe ao mundo desa!os tremendos durante 2020. As consequências da pandemia ainda são 
di"íceis de estimar. Contudo, a crise socioeconómica que atingiu todas as nações, das principais economias desenvolvi-
das aos países menos desenvolvidos, é transversal e bem visível. Apesar da existência de várias abordagens especí!cas, 
há um esforço global que se apoia em três áreas principais: investigação cientí!ca, orientada, em última análise, para 
encontrar uma cura ou uma vacina; uso de tecnologia para apoiar mudanças sociais em domínios tais como o traba-
lho, a educação a distância ou a deteção de risco; e medidas governamentais que promovem práticas de con!namento, 
isolamento e segurança. Esta investigação centra-se no uso da tecnologia para melhorar a resposta à pandemia nas 
sociedades em rede globalizadas, monitorizando padrões de interação entre as pessoas. O uso de aplicações de auto 
monitorização foi impulsionado por vários governos, desencadeando preocupações em relação à vigilância, controlo 
social e recolha de dados. Recorrendo ao walkthrough method, analisamos um grupo de 13 aplicações de mHealth 
lançadas por autoridades públicas durante 2020. Partindo de uma perspetiva sociológica crítica dos usos e consumos 
contemporâneos dos media digitais, reunimos dados que promovem uma compreensão mais profunda do papel que 
este tipo de aplicações tem na normalização das práticas de vigilância para !ns políticos e o seu impacto potencial na 
vida quotidiana.
Palavras-chave: Covid-19; aplicações de mHealth; vigilância governamental; auto monitorização; a%ordances.
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Introduction
Proclaimed as a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March 2020 
(WHO 2020), COVID-19 combines a public health threat and a socioeconomic crisis that seem 
to be changing human lives in unprecedented ways. In response to governments’ lockdown 
measures to limit the spread of the contagious virus following the WHO orientations, schools, 
universities, all sorts of businesses, stores, and restaurants were closed worldwide. In an at-
tempt to “&atten the curve” of infections during the outbreak, lockdown measures have includ-
ed, besides self-isolation, with people complying a required 14-day period at home, mandatory 
quarantine, and monitoring practices for policy governance. Amidst the crisis, the institution-
al responses comprised both the promotion of  “social distancing” and the implementation of 
surveillance procedures through digital technologies and digital data analytics. 
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While COVID-19 pandemic is not the $rst public health crisis to require that governments 
and public health authorities implement lockdown and surveillance measures, the current situa-
tion has an exceptional nature, considering the widespread usage and integration of digital tech-
nologies into everyday practices and routines of life. COVID-19 crisis arose in a globalised net-
work society (Castells, 1996), marked in the last years by an environment of deep mediatisation 
(Hepp, Breiter, & Hasebrink, 2018), and by the routinary use of information technologies to the 
inspection of individual's data and patterns of interaction, with people actively participating in it. 
In some locations, with the advent of COVID-19 existing and new digital technologies 
began to be harnessed by governments and public health authorities to improve the e%ec-
tiveness of lockdown measures and population control. Mobile health applications (mHealth 
apps), in particular, were quickly put into service of the self-monitoring and self-tracking of 
people's data and encounters as a way of “policing the infection” (Lupton, 2020). Despite 
growing concerns about the social, economic and political implications of these facilities for 
information collation and tracking, they are seemingly unifying the e%orts and concerns of 
law enforcement and public citizens.
As other surveillance practices, self-tracking applications can be seen as a form of so-
cial control with implications for power relations and democratic norms (Simões & Amaral, 
Forthcoming). Concerns about “big data” have already led to comprehensive overviews of 
technology as an artefact and a social process, which embodies new social relations and 
politics (Andrejevic, 2002, 2007; Lupton, 2014; Zuro%, 2015). Zuro% 's theory of “surveil-
lance capitalism” addresses digital information gathering as a process that aims to produce 
revenue and market control by “predicting and modifying human behaviour” (2015, p. 75). 
This is the institutional logic where technological a%ordances are designed and implement-
ed. Likewise, the new logic of gathering health information by public authorities and gov-
ernment agencies are blurring the lines between the right to privacy and bene$ts of digital 
surveillance, amplifying at the same time authorities capabilities for population control.
Hence, in the face of COVID-19 pandemic, alongside concerns with the crisis impact on 
social exclusion, racism and stigmatisation (Kwok, 2020; Logie & Turan, 2020; Rahman, 2020), 
critical social research has also been paying attention to the collective consequences of digi-
tal technologies and digital data analytics as epidemiological surveillance systems (French & 
Monahan, 2020; Kitchin, 2020; Lupton 2020; Selwyn & Jandri, 2020; Yu, 2020). 
For some (Kitchin, 2020; Yu, 2020), we are facing unprecedented challenges to civil liber-
ties. For others (French & Monahan, 2020; Lupton, 2020), surveillance dynamics at play are af-
fecting society and human rights in far-reaching ways. According to Lupton (2020), COVID-19 
triggered the “digitised quarantine”, a new form of health surveillance based in data sets gen-
erated by numerous sources and shaped by resonances with law enforcement. While re&ecting 
the “data-utopian visions”, the “digitised quarantine” foresees the dangers of data inaccura-
cies, biases and injustices, destabilising at the same time the meaning of privacy.
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In this chapter, we analyse the digital monitoring and surveillance practices by gov-
ernments and public health authorities through the use of mHealth apps. Stemming from a 
critical sociological perspective of contemporary digital media uses and consumptions and 
departing from analytics of governmentality (Foucault, 1991), we examine 13 mHealth apps 
launched by the initiative of public authorities during the outbreak through the walkthrough 
method. We question their role in normalising surveillance for political governance and their 
potential impact in the most individual and intimate domains of our lives. 
First, we contextualise and problematise the surveillance practices triggered in the wake 
of the COVID-19 public health crisis. We present a review of surveillance practices ties with 
technology and social control, particularly with self-tracking dynamics and the a%ordances 
of mobile applications (m-apps). We then analyse 13 institutional mobile health apps har-
nessed by public authorities to favour the self-monitoring and self-tracking of human bod-
ies and re&ect on the possible implications of these new surveillance tools for a post-COVID 
public sphere.
COVID-19 crisis and surveillance practices
Digital technology has played a relevant role in providing authorised information and 
health education in previous public health crises (Lupton, 2018). During the new coronavirus 
(SARS)CoV-2) crisis, digital media have been essential to keep people informed on what is hap-
pening. Also, people have been using digital media to stay in touch, ameliorate the e%ects of 
isolation (Ohme, Abeele, Van Gaeveren, Durnez, & De Marez, 2020), and maintain meaningful 
social activities such as formal education (Teräs, Suoranta, Teräs, & Curcher, 2020; Williamson, 
Eynon, & Potter, 2020). More signi$cantly, once the pandemic was declared, states and public 
agencies quickly turned to digital technology-led solutions to respond and control the crisis.
According to Kitchin (2020), $ve primary purposes explain this institutional dynamic:
“(1) quarantine enforcement/travel permission (knowing people are where they should be, either enfor-
cing home isolation for those infected or close contacts, or enabling approved movement for those not 
infected); (2) contact tracing (knowing whose path people have crossed); (3) pattern and #ow modelling 
(knowing the distribution of the disease and its spread and how many people passed through places); (4) 
social distancing and movement monitoring (knowing if people are adhering to recommended safe dis-
tances and to circulation restrictions); and (5) symptom tracking (knowing whether the population are 
experiencing any symptoms of the disease)” (Kitchin, 2020, p. 2).
Moreover, governments and public authorities began to use digital monitoring tools 
that were previously used for law enforcement or criminological purposes. Digital tools 
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used for counterterrorism were applied to track the phones owned by coronavirus carriers. 
Surveillance camera footage, smartphone location data, and credit card purchase records 
were used to track positive cases and their contacts (Kitchin, 2020). Furthermore, in tandem 
with the announcements of the lockdowns to prevent the spread of infections, several states 
harnessed the use of mobile apps to monitor individuals, identify infected persons and track 
people's daily interactions. In result, apps seem to be allowed not only the monitoring of one’s 
self for symptoms of illness but also the tracking of the spread of infected people and their 
encounters (Datta, 2020; Vaidyanathan, 2020). Thanks to apps, citizens were sometimes in-
vited, other times forced to engage in this new form of dataveillance.
Examples of the widespread institutional use of apps for these purposes can be found 
in various parts of the world. In late March 2020, besides recurring to CCTV technology and 
drones, public authorities in India pushed into use contact tracing and quarantining apps to 
monitor citizens. One of these apps, $rst launched in the region of Karnataka, uses “sel$es” 
for a facial recognition system that surveills quarantined individuals and ensures they adhere 
to self-isolation (Datta, 2020). Another app gathers a user’s identity, tracks people's move-
ment, and checks in real-time if people who have also downloaded the app are in the proxim-
ity of the user (Vaidyanathan, 2020). In some places of China, citizens were required to install 
an app and scan QR codes when accessing public spaces to validate their infection status and 
get permission to enter (Kitchin, 2020). Bluetooth enabled apps that detect and store infor-
mation from nearby phones for contact tracing were launched in several countries, such as 
Singapore (Woo, 2020), telling people to self-isolate if their phone detects an encounter with 
someone who is later diagnosed.
Although surveillance is a well-known social process in the context of a public health 
crisis, the current strategy against COVID-19 is posing renewed challenges, mainly due to 
the monitoring of one’s self for symptoms of illness, and the tracking of one’s movements. As 
other surveillance processes embed within everyday life, it certainly a%ects “power dynam-
ics, institutional practice, and interpersonal relations” (Brown, 2015, p. 1). More important, 
though, digital data analytics extend the government’s powers of surveillance towards inti-
mate life. Hence, they pose new challenges to civil liberties, data privacy and human rights 
(French & Monahan, 2020; Kitchin, 2020; Lupton 2020; Selwyn & Jandri, 2020; Yu, 2020), 
while undermining notions about healthy and abiding bodies and ideal selves.
Surveillance in the convergence culture 
Surveillance has become a relevant topic in the 21st century. It is the climax of a move-
ment that Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball refer to as “the dominant organising practice of late mo-
dernity” (2012, p. 1). It’s not only the issues that arise from peoples’ lives behind the screens. 
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Society faces the conundrum of surveillance everywhere, from supermarkets to airports. 
The $eld of surveillance studies (Lyon, Haggerty, & Ball, 2012) has emerged from the in-
tersection of diverse areas of research that had been focusing on topics that ranged from the 
war on terrorism to urban safety or the use of mobile media. The evolution of technology has 
played a vital role in the appearance of increasingly pervasive practices, and more complex 
social and ethical challenges, primarily since the limits of plain sight have been surpassed. 
However, technology alone, as it usually is the case, does not explain what has changed: other 
factors, like “changing governmental rationalities, the rise of managerialism, new risks (or 
perceived dangers), political expediency and public opinion” have to be taken into account 
(Lyon, Haggerty, & Ball, 2012, p. 2). Nevertheless, privacy defence mechanisms (either legal 
or technical) seem to fail in catching up with the evolution of technology. 
Currently, technology is present in every interstice of people’s lives. The new practices, 
habits and policies that characterise such a mediated society have shaped a new context for dis-
cussing surveillance: today, surveillance is more present and, at the same time, frequently more 
opaque, while it relates to increasingly blurred boundaries (Lyon, Haggerty, & Ball, 2012, p. 2-3).
The decisive change was brought by Web 2.0 and by the democratisation of access to 
mobile media. This participatory turn changed the way people relate to the internet and be-
come part of the information &ow. This process had a relevant impact on the way society sees 
the limits and dangers of surveillance. The transformation of a previously apathetic $gure 
of the receptor into a producer (what Bruns [2007] called the “produser”), led to the multi-
plication of content producers that are part of today’s participatory culture (Jenkins, Ford, & 
Green, 2013). In a permanently connected mode, people became avid viewers of other peo-
ple’s lives, exposing their personal information in unprecedented ways that reveal the grow-
ing tension between what was previously de$ned as public and private. However, the pene-
tration of social media platforms in peoples’ lives leads to a rather straightforward problem. 
As Bruno explains (2012, p. 345-346), surveillance becomes an issue when a possible employ-
er uses this information to decide about hiring someone. Yet, less visible processes occur in 
the information society. The personal use of the internet generates enormous amounts of 
data that results mainly from the use of web browsers and apps. That way,
social, subjective and cultural processes thus become susceptible to daily monitoring. Data that 
was previously costly and di$cult to access can be collected regularly, automatically and remotely. 
Behavioural, transactional, psychological, social and locational data are captured in real time wi-
thout the traditional mediation of interviewers and questionnaires (Bruno, 2012, p. 348).
This is the era of “participatory surveillance” as Bruno (2012) calls it, following Mark 
Poster’s terms (1990). Willfully or not, citizens permanently give personal information to 
both public and private services. That is why “dataveillance” is such a relevant topic. Despite 
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concerns with privacy threats and intrusiveness, users authorise the collection of data to ob-
tain personalised services, a better context-sensitive experience or even the apps’ plain use. 
They make a privacy trade-o% that takes into consideration the app value, the perceived in-
trusion and their own privacy concerns (Wottrich, Reijmersdal, & Smit, 2017). However, re-
search supports the general concerns regarding the rationality of such a deal: “smartphone 
users are often unaware of the data collected by their apps and express surprise and discom-
fort when they $nd out” (Almuhimedi, Schaub, Sadeh, Adjerid, Acquisti, Gluck, Cranor, & 
Agarwal, 2015, p. 787). This is called an information asymmetry (Almuhimedi et al., 2015), 
with implications for power-relations (Andrejevic, 2002, 2007; Lupton, 2014; Zuro%, 2015). 
Digitised quarantine and the quanti!ed self
Surveillance dynamics are also seen as processes and practices related to subjectivi-
ty-formation in everyday life (Lupton, 2015; Lupton, 2018; French & Monahan, 2020). In the 
light of this, “digitised quarantine” (Lupton, 2020) may be seen as profoundly productive, 
generating new habits and behaviours, embodying new identities and selves. Indeed, in re-
sponse to COVID-19 pandemic, monitoring one’s self for symptoms of illness became a com-
mon public health recommendation. Demanding people to act responsibly and be commit-
ted to self-monitoring con$gures a pattern against which all individuals are scrutinised.
Following Michel Foucault’s work on governmentality (1991), the “modern self ” can be 
understood in an interplay between the processes and practices of the state, on the one hand, 
and the micromanagement of the self and identity, on the other. To unpack the constructions 
of responsible subjects mHealth apps convey, we must recognise the e%ects of the neoliberal 
transformation of the twentieth century. 
The neoliberal drive implied that the management of public health was displaced from 
the state to the citizens. Personal behaviour and self-responsibility of citizens seem to empty 
the function of the welfare state. Yet, people voluntarily engaging in self-tracking to promote 
or manage their health reverberate a di%erent kind of “disruption” of healthcare and public 
health (Lupton, 2015). Hence, although the idea that one is responsible for regulating one’s 
body precedes our neoliberal era (Sysling, 2002), it seems that participatory surveillance in 
neoliberal times is changing the body and the self profoundly. 
A growing body of scholarship on digital surveillance has been critical on the impact 
of digital technology, namely considering power relations, inequalities, and commodi$ca-
tion through the promotion of voluntary records of individual quantitative data through the 
‘quanti$ed self ’ movement (van Dijck, 2014; Lupton, 2018). 
Critical research on digital surveillance technologies is concerned with dati$cation being 
a form of colonizing the life-world (Couldry & Mejias, 2019) as it enables the transformation 
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of individual and social behaviours into quanti$ed data (Ruckenstein & Pantzar, 2017). Data-
driven technologies, within the algorithmic culture of mobile apps and digital platforms, 
promote the digitization of self-tracking (Lupton, 2016), which facilitates the quantifying of 
everyday life. Likewise, these technologies promote individualization and self-responsibili-
sation. The ‘quanti$ed self ’ promotes a “way of co-opting, coordinating and commodifying 
human activity, enmeshing people in what Foucault (1977) called the microphysics of power, 
a grid that binds them to an everyday life lived thoughtlessly” (Agger, 2011, p. 122).
The ‘quanti$ed self ’ is anchored to a supposed theory of self-regulation that promotes 
self-quanti$cation to achieve self-understanding through the analysis of data generated by 
tracking (Ruckenstein & Pantzar, 2017). Therefore, it presupposes that citizens could take 
informed actions concerning their body or di%erent experiences.
These mHealth apps launched by governments and public health authorities to digital-
ly monitor positive cases of Covid19 may normalise digital surveillance practices within the 
promotion of self-tracking as a self-responsibilisation.
Methods 
The study aimed to: i) map the $rst digital public health m-apps created by public au-
thorities (simultaneously available for iOS and Android); ii) critically examine the promotion 
of self-quanti$cation and self-tracking practices; and iii) identify which digital contact tracing 
methods are implemented in order to analyse if they promote a normalising of digital surveil-
lance. To achieve these objectives, a search was conducted in the App Store and Google Play 
during the outbreak, from 1 to 9 April 2020, for apps containing the word “COVID-19”. We 
identi$ed 13 mobile apps that were available in both operating systems and had been created 
by the initiative of governments and public authorities from di%erent countries. We analysed 
these apps through the walkthrough method. Taking into account a medium-speci$c approach 
(Rogers, 2013) and the a%ordances of mobile apps (Bucher & Helmond, 2017), we engage direct-
ly with the app’s interface to analyse functions and features (Light, Burgess, & Duguay, 2018) 
and digital contact tracing characteristics (Gasser, Ienca, Scheibner, Sleigh, & Vayena, 2020). 
The empirical study’s $rst stage was the observation and documentation of the screens, 
features, and activity &ows through the walkthrough method. The second stage focused on 
analysing the interfaces from a multidimensional approach: apps’ functions, features and 
digital contact tracing characteristics — data type, data source, model of consent (Gasser et 
al., 2020), and tracing approach (Barrat, Cattuto, Kivelä, Lehmann, & Saramäki, 2020). We 
move away from questions of representation to consider the extent to which these apps as 
operational media (Dieter, Gerlitz, Helmond, Tkacz, van der Vlist, & Weltevrede, 2019) are 
designed to promote and constrain certain behaviours and not merely meanings. 
Rita Basílio de Simões,  Inês Amaral, Sílvio Santos
!'-
The functions and features dimension considers navigational characteristics and func-
tionalities available through di%erent levels of ‘a%ordances-in-practice’ (Costa, 2018), i.e., 
a%ordances that depend on their use in a given context or situation. 
To identify the digital contact tracing characteristics we de$ned four variables: i) data 
type — categorization of data collected into non-identifying personal data, sensitive personal 
data and non-sensitive personal data; ii) data source — the form of data collection by citizens, 
Bluetooth, global positioning system (GPS), third party, other; iii) model of consent — the 
type of agreement for data collection: opt-in consent, opt-out consent and mandatory use 
(Gasser et al., 2020); iv) typology of digital contact tracing approach: manual contract trac-
ing, surveillance tracing, exposure noti$cation (proximity tracing decentralized), and digi-
tally-sensed proximity network (proximity centralized) (Barrat et al., 2020; Riemer, Ciriello, 
Peter, & Schlagwein, 2020).
Results and Discussion
Concerning digital contact tracing characteristics, the analysis showed that all the appli-
cations are free and follow an opt-in consent (Table 1) — except Coronavirus Australia, which 
is an information app. Most of the analysed m-apps do not require registration, although it is 
mandatory in four (STOP COVID19 CAT, Plan Jalisco Covid-19, COVID19 Regione Sardegna, 
and GVA Coronavirus). However, the record is not directly related to the type of data collect-
ed. Results show that there are applications (Bolivia Segura and Asistencia COVID-19) that 
do not require registration but, with the user’s consent through the introduction of the data, 
will collect sensitive personal data.
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Coronavírus — SUS  Brazil NIPD Bluetooth No Opt-in Exposure 
Noti$cation
Bolivia Segura Bolivia SPD GPS No Opt-in N/A*
Canada COVID-19  Canada NIPD Citizens No Opt-in N/A*
Asistencia COVID-19  Spain
(restricted to 
some regions)
SPD GPS No Opt-in N/A*
STOP COVID19 CAT Spain —  
Catalonia 
Government
SPD GPS Mandatory Opt-in N/A*
Plan Jalisco Covid-19  Mexico 
(Jalisco State)
SPD GPS Mandatory Opt-in Surveillance 
tracing
Covid-19 UAE UAE SPD / NIPD Bluetooth / 
GPS






SPD GPS Mandatory Opt-in Surveillance 
tracing
TreCovid19 Italy (Trento 
Government)








NIPD Citizens No Opt-in N/A*
Coronavirus 
Australia
Australia N/A* N/A* No N/A* N/A*
CoronAPP — 
Colombia
Colombia NIPD / SPD Bluetooth Optional Opt-in Exposure 
Noti$cation
GVA Coronavirus Spain 
(Valencia 
Government)
SPD Citizens Mandatory Opt-in Surveillance 
tracing
* N/A — not available
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Table 1: Walkthrough analysis of digital contact tracing characteristics.
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As Table 1 shows, apps that have optional registration (Covid-19 UAE, TreCovid19, and 
CoronAPP — Colombia) only collect sensitive personal data upon user registration. The data 
source of analysed apps is mostly GPS. However, two apps use Bluetooth (Coronavirus — SUS 
and CoronAPP — Colombia), one has a double combination of data collection via Bluetooth 
and GPS (Covid-19 UAE) and four request information from citizens (Canada COVID-19, 
TreCovid19, BC COVID-19 Support, and GVA Coronavirus).
Through the analysis, it was assessed that the digital contact tracing approach of expo-
sure noti$cation relies on non-identifying personal data and collects data through Bluetooth. 
This is a non-intrusive approach that is based on the collection of epidemiological data with-
out resorting to sensitive personal data. The user enters data related to COVID-19 infection 
that is counted for the country’s statistics and enables an alert for other users through a noti-
$cation via Bluetooth.
However, most apps (Bolivia Segura, Canada COVID-19, Asistencia COVID-19, STOP 
COVID19 CAT, BC COVID-19 Support, and Coronavirus Australia) do not indicate their 
tracing approach. Among these apps, there is one whose registration is mandatory (STOP 
COVID19 CAT) and sensitive personal data is collected. This type of data is also collected in 
two apps that collect data through GPS (Bolivia Segura and Asistencia COVID-19) without 
information concerning how data will be used. This lack of explanation about the use of user 
data, whether when requesting non-identifying personal data or sensitive personal data, is 
worrying because it normalises data collection as a common practice.
Features and functions available on m-apps were analysed from an ‘a%ordances-in-prac-
tice’ (Costa, 2018) approach. Depending on the context, on the practices through which they 
are enacted and on the speci$c digital-material entanglement that is thus con$gured, a%or-
dances variously operate by demanding, requesting, allowing, encouraging or discourag-
ing users’ practices (Davis & Chouinard, 2016). Table 2 presents the results of features and 
functions analysis by “engaging directly with an app’s interface to examine its technologi-
cal mechanisms and embedded cultural references to understand how it guides users and 
shapes their experiences” (Light, Burgess, & Duguay, 2018, p. 882).
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APP Country Functions and Features
Coronavírus — SUS  Brazil Users are guided through a simple menu and on-screen navigation 
buttons focus on alerts, news and tips.
When opening the app, authorization to send noti$cations is requested; 
the user can allow or disallow; it is not possible to choose the type of 
noti$cation. Exposure is included in these noti$cations.
Bolivia Segura Bolivia Users are guided through an on-screen navigation buttons menu 
referring to information and prevention, o/cial data, news and self-
tracking data. When opening the app, authorization to send noti$cations 
is requested; the user can allow or disallow, it is not possible to choose 
the type of noti$cation.
Canada COVID-19  Canada On the initial screen users are informed of the app’s features: the latest 
updates, trusted resources, and personalized symptom tracking. To 
advance, users must enable the “start” button. On the second screen, it 
is mandatory to choose the province/territory. Before using the app, the 
user can select three options or skip: assess her / his risk, resources about 
COVID-19 and self-isolation, and the possibility to activate noti$cations 
and receive o/cial information.
Users are guided through an on-screen navigation buttons menu 
referring to stats, updates, resources, and self-check (self-assessment 
and symptom tracker). A dropdown menu presents settings and a “wall 
of kindness” with acts of kindness happening across Canada.
Asistencia COVID-19  Spain
(restricted to 
some regions)
Users are informed on the $rst screen of the app’s features: instructions 
and recommendations based on their health situation, health self-
assessment, help healthcare professionals, self-assessment every 12h. To 
advance, users must enable the “start” button. On the second screen, it is 
mandatory to choose the province/territory. The third screen asks for the 
mobile number to go forward. App’s features allow users to perform self-
diagnostic, access prevention and care recommendations, and updated 
information.
STOP COVID19 CAT Spain  
(Catalonia 
Government)
User’s consent and acceptance of conditions and privacy policy of the 
app is asked on the $rst screen.
App asks for the Personal Identi$cation Code from the health card. On 
the start screen, there will be the main action button and, depending on 
the user, there may be secondary actions buttons that will be enabled 
by clicking next. Start screen displays a self-assessment test. Secondary 
screens are history, pro$le and QR code reader.
Plan Jalisco Covid-19  Mexico 
(Jalisco State)
The $rst screen asks for mandatory registration. Users are guided 
through a dropdown menu providing tools for self-isolation, information 
on Covid-19 in Jalisco, and a self-monitoring test.
Covid-19 UAE UAE The $rst screen asks for optional registration. App asks for permission to 
use GPS. Users that complete registration and enable location detection 
can carry out self-monitoring actions. Users are guided through an on-
screen navigation buttons menu referring to real-time data (tests, cases, 
deaths and recoveries), self-assessment tools, resources on preventive 
measures, news/announcements, psychological advice, and a map with 
the nearest diagnostic centres.
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Upon opening the app, authorization to send noti$cations is requested; 
the user can allow or disallow, it is not possible to choose the type of 
noti$cation. The $rst screen asks for mandatory registration. Users are 
guided through a menu that allows registration of stays (for travellers), 
voluntary travel mode, registrations and movements, and settings.
TreCovid19 Italy (Trento 
Government)
Users are guided through a simple menu and on-screen navigation 
buttons focus on data, information on COVID-19 and a restricted area to 
patients in home isolation or under health surveillance.




Users are informed on the $rst screen of anonymous use of information 
and app’s features: the latest updates and recommendations from 
experts. To advance, users must enable the “start” button. The second 
screen asks for the user’s current travel status. Before using the app, the 
user can select three options or skip: assess her / his risk, resources about 
COVID-19 and receive the latest updates. Users are guided through an 
on-screen navigation buttons menu referring to stats, updates, resources, 
and self-check (self-assessment and symptom tracker). A header menu 
presents a self-isolation plan for travellers and settings.
Coronavirus Australia Australia Users are guided through a simple menu and on-screen navigation 
buttons focus on numbers, advice, health care services, and other related 
content. The homepage provides information on a self-tracking app 
(COVIDSafe app), respiratory clinics or testing centres, restrictions and 
travel, and news.
CoronAPP — Colombia Colombia Upon opening the app, authorization to send noti$cations is requested; 
the user can allow, allow for one time or disallow. The $rst screen 
asks for optional registration. Users that complete registration and 
enable location detection can carry out self-monitoring actions. Users 
are guided through a dropdown menu with information on the app, 
phone numbers for health and help services, health centres, and data 
on Coronavirus in Colombia. This information is simpli$ed in a footer 
graphic on-screen navigation menu.
GVA Coronavirus Spain (Valencia 
Government)
When opening the app, users should choose the language. The second 
screen asks for a personal identi$cation number and date of birth. 
The app is directly linked to the Valencia health service. It o%ers the 
possibility to a person who has been in close contact with a positive case 
of COVID to $ll out a daily self-report to indicate if she/he presents 
symptoms throughout the day. The self-report option will be available 
in the app after the $rst telephone contact with the family doctor and 
only if the user agrees to follow-up through this system. Users are guided 
through on-screen navigation buttons that allow users to insert their 
direct contact, self-monitoring, information on COVID19 and FAQS.
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Functions and features of the analysed apps are activated with on-screen navigation 
buttons. The navigation meets criteria of accessibility (interface without obstacles), 
functionality (utility of the function for the tasks), and usability (maximising the system's 
resources concerning e%ectiveness, e/ciency, and satisfaction of use) (Amaral, 2016). 
Although the navigation is simple, user experience is focused on pre-established features that 
structure (and collect) users’ data. Therefore, technology is intrusive despite surveillance being 
presented as a self-tracking function in normative models of citizen accountability. Anchored 
to the ‘quanti$ed self ’ metaphor, these normative models present di%erent a%ordances for 
demanding, requesting, allowing, encouraging or discouraging users’ practices (Davis & 
Chouinard, 2016). By emphasising wellbeing, apps may encourage or discourage behaviours 
under a normalisation of digital surveillance. Apps also a%ord requests (users engagement), 
demands (registration), refuse (by making some functions not available for users that are not 
registered, for instance) and also allow (navigating in a neutral structure, for example). The 
interrelation of a%ordances mechanisms in functions and features of analysed apps enhances 
di%erent interaction dynamics between users and artefacts. Therefore, apps a%ord in their 
sociostructural environments concerning the context of use.
Conclusion
Mandatory quarantine and social isolation to limit the spread of the COVID-19 virus 
(SARS)CoV-2) are two well-known measures to manage populations and sick people in an 
epidemic crisis. Over time, governments and public health authorities have also used di%er-
ent kinds of technological tools to inform and control citizens and risk groups in response to 
public health threats. As we say, what seems new since the COVID-19 pandemic has emerged 
is the role that digital technologies have been playing. Mobile health apps, in particular, are 
harnessed by public authorities to favour the self-monitoring and self-tracking of individu-
als’ health, movements, and encounters. Despite concerns about the limits of privacy and 
surveillance, they seem to be unifying the e%orts and worries of law enforcement and public 
citizens. Nevertheless, what our analysis shows is that mobile applications are, above all, dis-
ciplinary mechanisms at the service of states. 
Recurring to the walkthrough method, we analysed 13 m-apps from the initiative of 
public authorities from di%erent countries, which are, $rstly, statistical tools that allow the 
collection of data for policy government. At the same time, they are instruments that normal-
ise the practices of self-monitoring and self-surveillance of human bodies, concealing the 
fact that they are intrusive technologies. All apps are based on opt-in consent, although only 
a few demand it directly. In these cases, consent is required to use the app. The same happens 
in cases where access to GPS/Bluetooth or noti$cations is requested. Without these features, 
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the use of apps does not make sense since they do not detect cases of exposure, do not collect 
data and/or do not alert users of exposure to contagion. Hence, while launched as individual 
and collective security mechanisms, they are powerful tools that promote digital surveillance 
at di%erent levels: from mobile phone tracking to sensitive personal data collection. Indeed, 
through m-apps public authorities are able to map personal information, movements and 
meetings between citizens. 
Also signi$cant is that the majority of the 13 m-apps are absent in relation to what gov-
ernments and public health authorities do with personal data. Some apps request access to 
truly sensitive personal data, such as health security numbers, travel tickets, information 
about contacts, details of individual health state. Others, besides requesting sensitive data, 
are based on a surveillance tracing approach and ask people to repeatedly enter personal data 
(in some cases, twice a day).
Furthermore, we also saw how these COVID-19 self-tracking apps encouraged people 
to think about their bodies and their selves through numbers and wellbeing resonances. They 
promote the ‘quanti$ed self ’, giving way, in Lupton's words, to “an algorithmic subjectivity, in 
which the body and its health states, functions and activities are portrayed and understood pre-
dominantly via quanti$ed calculations, predictions and comparisons” (2015, p. 450).
At a time when we are witnessing a new wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, with gov-
ernments around the world harnessing m-apps to control the spread of the disease, includ-
ing in Portugal, we must surely continue to investigate the novel state usages of these dig-
ital technologies and problematise the challenges they pose to concepts of self, identity, 
privacy, and embodiment.
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